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Clinging to the Common Law in an Age of
Statutes: Criminal Law in the States
Michael G. Heyman

†

INTRODUCTION
March 20, 2014, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the
conviction of Javier Fernandez for aggravated discharge of a
1
firearm in the direction of a peace officer. Taken alone, that’s
unexceptional, as is the issue of whether the evidence
supported that conviction. However, things start to turn
strange when we learn that Fernandez neither discharged the
firearm, nor even knew that the confederate who did so
2
was armed. Thus, unable to affirm the conviction based on his
actions, the Court relied on a peculiar notion of accountability
3
known locally as “common design.” More generally, this odd
view parades under the name of the “natural and probable
consequences doctrine,” whereby guilt for the first offense
4
automatically entails guilt for all subsequent offenses.
Its use here reflects three troubling features of many
recent judicial decisions on criminal law: 1. An apparent
inability to deal with criminal statutes that alter the common
law, 2. A preference for judicial policymaking over conflicting
legislative norms, and 3. An indifference to the quality of
criminal law doctrine, as that body of law seemingly has few
5
champions. Fortunately, a major development in the 1960s led

† Professor Emeritus, The John Marshall Law School (Chicago).
1. People v. Fernandez, 2014 IL 115527, available at http://www.state.il
.us/court/Opinions/SupremeCourt/2014/115527.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
2. “Here, however, the State failed to produce any evidence showing that
defendant even knew Gonzalez had a gun, let alone that he knew that
Gonzalez would discharge that gun in the direction of a police officer.” Id. at 4.
3. Id. at 5.
4. See generally, JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW
TH
475 (6 ed. 2012). As Dressler points out, this reflects the common law view,
and is the “law today in most jurisdictions . . . .” Id.
5. Observing the dismal state of things, the late Bill Stuntz said:
“Criminal law scholars may be talking to each other (and to a few judges), but
they do not appear to be talking to anyone else.” William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 508 (2001).
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to widespread criminal law reform, dramatically affecting the
codes of numerous states. Remaining to be seen was the depth,
breadth and lasting pervasiveness of those changes.
I. SOME DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND
For centuries, Criminal Law contained a veritable morass
of peculiar, morally-tinged and nonfunctional doctrine, chiefly
6
in the area of culpability. For nearly ten years, the American
Law Institute worked on the creation of a model code to
improve this situation, culminating in its promulgation of the
7
Model Penal Code in 1962. Through it, this welter of mental
states was reduced to four: Purpose, knowledge, recklessness
8
and negligence. Leading to law reform in dozens of states, the
Code stood as a signal achievement in defining the conditions
legitimizing the imposition of criminal sanctions on our
citizens.
These achievements were particular noteworthy and
valuable in the area of accomplice liability, as the common law
represented an ungainly, baroque structure often yielding
9
unjust results. The Code solution, by contrast, proved
particularly clean and elegant, predicating liability on an
individual’s purposeful participation in the criminal
10
enterprise. This formulation perfectly mirrors established
predicates for guilt: One must engage in a voluntary act, with
11
the prescribed mental state present. However, the challenge
here was particularly urgent as, by definition, we’re talking
about guilt for the criminal conduct of another, derivative
liability. Rejecting any version of guilt by association, the Code
required a linkage between criminal actors demonstrating the
accomplice’s commitment to achieving each criminal objective.
The very title of the Code’s section on accountability
signals this necessary linkage: “Liability for Conduct of
12
Another; Complicity.” Too complex to discuss in detail here,
6. Concepts such as general and specific intent, abandoned and
malignant heart, vicious will, implied and express malice and malice
aforethought generally littered criminal cases and confounded juries alike.
7. MODEL PENAL CODE Pt. I: General Provisions (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1985), Pt. II: Definition of Specific Crimes (Official Draft
and Revised Comments 1980).
8. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02.
9. Its manifold categories of principals and accessories were bedeviling,
as were its corresponding culpability notions.
10. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (3)(a).
11. That is, absolute liability is strongly disfavored by the Code.
12. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06.
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that section nevertheless establishes very basic requirements
for guilt. Stating that a person is “guilty of an offense if it is
committed by his own conduct,” it then proceeds to elaborate on
the requirements for derivative liability, that is when someone
is legally accountable for the conduct of another that constitutes
13
the target offense. For present purposes, this critical section
predicates accountability on one’s being an accomplice to each
crime, which itself requires the purposeful promotion or
14
facilitation of the target offense. As an accomplice then, that
15
conduct is hers, as if she had engaged in it herself.
The Illinois code took the same tack, even predating the
official Code by one year. Duplicating the same principles and
language, it carefully divides the principal Code section, thus
making clear its mechanism for establishing when one is
accountable for the conduct of another “which an element of an
16
offense.” Establishing this closed system for liability, it
requires proof of purposeful aid to establish complicity, crime
by crime. “Common design” obviously violates this scheme by
definition, providing automatic liability for all subsequent
offenses.
II. GETTING DOWN TO CASES—BUT NOT STATUTES
Javier Fernandez was convicted of a single count of firearm
17
discharge, and sentenced to 12 years in prison. Part of a
botched burglary of a parked car, Fernandez remained in his
vehicle while his friend, Gonzalez, tried to steal the car’s
18
radio. Moments later, he heard shots, as he pulled out of the
19
parking space. Gonzalez had fired the shots at a police officer,
though Fernandez was unaware that he was even armed at
20
21
that time. They had not been together.
13. Id. at § 2.06(1). Understand, this entire machinery provides a
mechanism through which the conduct of another is imputed to the
accomplice, as if she had engaged in it herself.
14. Id.
15. For a more extensive discussion of this precise topic, see Michael G.
Heyman, The Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine: A Case Study in
Failed Law Reform, 15 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW 388 (2010).
16. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-1 (West 1993). That section is
captioned “Accountability for Conduct of Another” and the following section
bears the label of “When accountability exists.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/5-2 (West 1993).
17. 2014 IL 115527 at 1.
18. Id. at 2–4.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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Intuitively, we do see Fernandez as part of the
unsuccessful burglary, but also see him as clearly innocent on
the firearm charge. Indeed, it would seem wildly
disproportionate to sentence him to twelve years for so little
22
participation . Obviously the courts did not agree. But why
not? That’s partially answered by the difficulty courts seem to
have accepting statutes that depart from the common law, and
in coping with those statutes themselves.
Entirely ignoring both statutory language and legislative
history, the Fernandez court proclaimed the accountability
statute as embodying the “intent” of incorporating “the
23
principle of the common- design rule.” Totally unsupportable,
that remark both flouts the statutory language as well as
24
expert commentary on that language. Moreover, though the
Illinois legislature recently codified this common design rule,
the court failed to even cite to that section, though it could have
25
been dispositive. Instead, it turned to ancient case law in
support of its assertions, preferring precedent to statutory
interpretation.
Forty years previously, a poor zhlub named Rudy Kessler
had the misfortune to team up with the wrong people at the
26
wrong time. Setting out with this group to get their hands on
22. See generally, Michael G. Heyman, Losing All Sense of Just
Proportion: The Peculiar Law of Accomplice Liability, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
129 (2013) (explaining the rampant confusion and resultant unfairness among
accountability laws).
23. 2014 IL 115527at 5.
24. Code commentary referred to this “probability consequence” theory as
“incongruous and unjust,” noting that, “if anything, the culpability level for
the accomplice should be higher than that of the principal actor, because there
is generally more ambiguity in the overt conduct” of that actor and thus “a
higher risk of convicting the innocent.”(Emphasis supplied.) MODEL PENAL
CODE Pt. I: General Provisions (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985),
Pt. II: Definition of Specific Crimes (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1980), comments at note 42. Similarly, the Illinois Committee Comments from
1961 note that the new section “alters and modifies the former law.” S.H.A.,
commentary to section 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2 (West 1993).
Moreover, it clearly provides that “liability under this subsection requires an
‘intent to promote or facilitate’” the substantive crime. Id. The Court was
clearly wrong about so-called “legislative intent.”
25. The current code (applicable to this case), in an unlettered paragraph
reads: “When 2 or more persons engage in a common criminal design or
agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common design committed by
one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the common design or
agreement and all are equally responsible for the consequences of those
further acts.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2 (2008). As previously noted,
this section creates an internal conflict within that section on the basis for
accomplice liability.
26. People v. Kessler, 57 Ill. 2d 493 (1974).
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some money, he sat in the passenger seat of the car, as his two
unarmed compatriots entered a bar after closing at which
27
Kessler had once worked. Somehow, gunfire was exchanged as
they fired an available gun inside, as well as from their fleeing
28
vehicle. Ultimately, all were convicted on two counts of
attempted murder (as well as burglary) and sentenced to 5-15
29
years on each count.
The appellate court reversed the attempted murder
convictions, finding them unsupported by the governing
30
statute, as Kessler never intended to kill anyone. However,
31
grudgingly announcing that result, it nevertheless expressed
its preference for common design as “a more reasonable
approach to the law of accountability but one which we cannot
32
adopt in contravention of the language of the Code.” The state
Supreme Court felt no such compunctions, and has not in the
intervening 40 years.
Ultimately, the resurrection of this legal relic was the
product of the Court’s interpretation of a single word,
“conduct.” In Kessler, the state argued that an accomplice to the
target offense was responsible for all subsequent conduct of his
cohorts even, as there, that unplanned pair of attempted
murders. Accepting that argument, that Court latched onto
that single word, ignoring both context and the obvious purpose
of accountability under the then-recent code. It arrived at this
staggering conclusion by citing to the general definition of
“conduct” within the code as “an act or series of acts, and the
33
accompanying mental state.” Thus was created an open-ended
liability wholly ignoring basic principles of culpability. Gone
was the requirement that punishment follows one’s choice to
commit harm, replaced instead by guilt by association.
Naturally, that entirely dissociates that word from its
context. An accomplice is responsible for conduct that is an
element of the offense in which she participated. Of course that
includes the act or acts that comprise that conduct, but to read
27. Id. at 49–95.
28. Id.
29. 11 Ill. App. 3d 321, 323 (1973) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 57 Ill. 2d 493
(1974).
30. 57 Ill. 2d 493 (1974). Understand that to purposefully promote
something, he must obviously know of it and, as here, intend to achieve its
objective, here the death of the two victims.
31. The court noted that the “Code provision . . . substantially departs
from prior Illinois law . . . .” 11 Ill. App. 3d at 327, n.3.
32. Id.
33. 57 Ill. 2d at 496 (referencing section 5/2-4).
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a word apart from surrounding language and context reveals a
startling inability to cope with statutes. Whether driven by
ideology, incompetence or a simple indifference to results in
attempting to clear the docket, the Kessler result stood as a low
point in Illinois criminal jurisprudence. Accordingly, when
Fernandez went up to the Court, many hoped to see the demise
of common design, through one mechanism or another.
III. STARE DECISIS IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Over a quarter-century ago, Bill Eskridge observed an
unduly strong presumption of correctness afforded to statutory
34
precedents. In the intervening years, he and others have
written on this and, more importantly, created a true discipline
of statutory interpretation. Unfortunately, like many courts
nationwide, the Fernandez court seemed methodologically
frozen in time, unaffected by the progress of the academy.
That’s poignantly demonstrated by its deference to Kessler.
The Fernandez appellate court affirmed the conviction,
over a marvelous concurrence by Justice Gordon. The only
judge in either appellate court to even cite to the commondesign section, he urged his panel to consider the statute “as an
35
entirety.” Rejecting the notion of an anomalous provision
providing a separate, conflicting, basis for liability, he
harmonized it within that statute, thus requiring proof on
intent to promote each particular offense charged. That
approach was as soundly dismissed by the Supreme Court, as
was the appellate opinion in Kessler itself. Its reasoning was
36
rejected “in its entirety.”
Indeed, three aspects of the Court’s opinion reflect its
disdain for legislation and apotheosis of judicial policymaking.
First, forsaking statutory analysis, it instead labeled Kessler a
“textbook application of the common-design rule,” and it
37
dictated the Fernandez result. Pure stare decisis of statutory
34. William N. Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L. J.
1361 (1988). Eskridge is currently the John A. Garver Professor of
Jurisprudence at Yale Law School. He and the late Philip Frickey pioneered
the development of interpretation as a serious discipline, bringing it into the
modern era, indeed in creating that era itself.
35. 2012 IL App (1st) 101913-U, appeal allowed (May 29, 2013), appeal
pending (May 2013), aff'd, 2014 IL 115527 at 17, available at http://
illinoiscourts.gov/R23_Orders/AppellateCourt/2012/1stDistrict/1101913_R23.p
df (last visited Apr. 27, 2014).
36. People v. Fernandez, 2014 IL 115527 at 6.
37. Id. Additionally, the Court found it “difficult to conceive of two
unrelated cases that are more factually alike than these two.” Id. at 7.
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interpretation, that. Second, it quoted approvingly from the
State’s brief, in which it said “conceding his guilt for the
burglary . . . defendant has effectively conceded his guilt for
38
[the] aggravated discharge of a firearm.” A chilling statement,
39
the Court nevertheless noted, “This is exactly right.” Finally,
when confronted by recent case law that at least nuanced
common design, trying to give some actual meaning to the term
(resulting in overturned convictions), it emphatically rejected
those cases to “correct that mistake so that similar missteps are
40
avoided going forward.” With each move, it asserted the
primacy of the judiciary in the development of criminal law
doctrine, thereby resisting the changes made by the code over
41
53 years previously.
CLOSING REFLECTIONS
Fernandez is remarkable, but this Essay is no mere case
note. Rather, providing a snapshot of one facet of our criminal
justice system, it offers a disquieting reminder of the uneasy
relationship between courts and legislatures. Ronald Dworkin
devoted an extraordinary career to distinguishing these roles,
noting how “legislation invites judgments of policy that
adjudication does not, by observing how inclusive integrity
42
enforces distinct judicial constraints of role.” Always insisting
on this distinction between policy and principle, he saw no
room for the kind of judicial meddling discussed here. Uniquely
suited to making these policy decisions, legislatures properly
decide critical issues (with the appropriate tools) about how we
treat our citizens in both the fact and severity of the criminal
sanctions imposed for transgressions. They have a democratic
legitimacy entirely lacking in the judiciary.
By contrast, in perhaps the ultimate irony, the very
codification of common design in 2009 represents a perverse
Remarkably, the factual similarities consist of the total unawareness of the
poor accomplice of what his companions were doing.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 10.
41. In fact, the United States Supreme Court decided a similar case on
March 5, 2014. Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014). There, the
two offenses were a drug offense and use of a firearm. Id. at 1243.
Highlighting the relationship between choice and culpability, Justice Kagan
noted that “When an accomplice knows nothing of a gun until it appears at the
scene, . . . the defendant has not shown the requisite intent to assist a crime
involving a gun.” Id. at 1249.
42. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 410 (1986).
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victory for common law, a common law smuggled in as a code
amendment, and entirely ignored by a court that had been
applying the self-same notion for decades, perceiving no need
for legislative approval. Formally a part of the Illinois code, it
serves little purpose other than as a reminder of the resilience
of common law theory.
A law reform commission dominated by prosecutors
proposed it as part of a package sent to the state legislature in
43
2009-10. Thus, proclaiming common design the law “for over
one hundred and fifty years,” it referred it to the state
legislature, which, undoubtedly unwittingly, embedded it in the
44
existing section on accountability. Indeed, that language
coming verbatim from Kessler was inserted unchanged,
45
containing usage ill suited to legislation. In all of this we feel
that deeper politics of criminal law creation, one Stuntz
observed “always pushes toward broader liability rules, and
46
toward harsher sentences as well.”
Yet, a technical parsing of these issues should not obscure
the fundamental injustices wrought by common law trumping
careful legislative deliberations and choices, especially on
accountability. “Common design” imposes guilt by metaphor,
while the real criminal actors must be proved guilty beyond a
47
reasonable doubt as to all material elements of the offense. As
I have said previously, common law notions pervade modern
criminal law in the face of flatly conflicting statutes throughout
the United States. However, here the results are most malign.
Providing an open-ended, culpability-free basis for liability, it
permits the punishment of people who have never committed
the offenses charged. Through that, it thoughtlessly affects
countless lives, indeed taking people’s lives from them without
the slightest justification.
[Editor’s Note: In the next issue of this journal, Professor
Heyman will examine some very recent developments in this

43. Designated, the CLEAR Commission, it replaced one earlier chaired
by Paul Robinson, one that emphatically denounced this doctrine. For
information on CLEAR, see the materials at http://clearinitiative.org/ (last
visited Apr. 14, 2014).
44. James R. Thompson, et al., The Illinois Criminal Code of 2009:
Providing Clarity in the Law, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 815, 823 (2008).
45. The language appears in Kessler, 57 Ill. 2d at 496-97. The particularly
odd language is that saying the acts of one are “considered to be” that of all.
That’s not a cognizable legal concept.
46. Stuntz, supra note 5, at 51 (emphasis in original).
47. Such as Gonzalez in the Fernandez case.
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area, and will consider the Constitutionality of the doctrine
itself.]

